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Can global governance be democratic? That is the question that brings
protesters into the streets in Seattle and Prague and Washington and has
national and international government officials working on a host of re-
forms to enhance "transparency" and "access" to their global
deliberations. It has motivated a raft of efforts to define global governance
and to distinguish it from government of various types. The next step, at
least for many, is to redefine democracy.
Many analyses seek to elaborate a post-modem conception of
democracy, one that can at least provide the foundation or the framework
for democratic global governance. They proceed from the assumption that
the old modern conception of democracy relies on an identifiable polity
within defined boundaries that can be assumed to exercise a fictional
unitary will to create a hierarchical body of law. Such a conception cannot
be globalized without the creation of a world state, which is generally
* Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University.
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agreed to be both impossible and undesirable. Conversely, however, these
analyses agree that globalization cannot be stopped or shut down. The
alternative, at least intellectually, is to redefine the terms of the debate.
The post-modernists begin with a redefinition of the self, and proceed
to a redefinition of democracy, the state, sovereignty, and law. There are
almost as many variations on these themes as there are authors, but within
this radically reconceptualized world, many new possibilities for self-
government within a globalized economy and society emerge. These are
fundamentally optimistic scenarios, fashioned by scholars unafraid to
grapple with seismic shifts in human self-perception, technology, and
mental geography. They are genuinely breaking the boundaries of political
possibility.
The results are heady, exciting, and likely to be unintelligible to the
vast majority of policymakers, activists, and citizens who seek to achieve
specific goals in an age of globalization, information, and politicization.
Reinterpreting Rousseau's theory of the general will, as compelling as it
may prove to political philosophers, will not change the view of those who
perceive themselves to be disenfranchised through globalization. These
actors may in fact be making a post-modem world, but the purportedly
outdated "modern" ideas of democracy--electoral accountability, the
control of the elite by the mass, a clear understanding of who is governing
whom and by what means-remain remarkably potent.' Perceptions that
international institutions, much less shadowy "networks" of government
officials, are fundamentally undemocratic are easy to promulgate and hard
to erase.
The problem is not merely rhetorical. Proponents of global govern-
ance, particularly through multiple parallel networks of public and private
actors, must offer at least a partial response to the problems of democracy
as traditionally defined, before redefining it. After all, in true post-modern
fashion, post-modernity cannot displace modernity, but only exist along-
side it.
I propose in this essay to develop a typology of more concrete and
prosaic accountability problems connected with a rapidly growing form of
global governance: transgovernmental regulatory networks, or, more
generally, "government networks."2 These are networks of national
I. Robert Dahl, who, in a sense, has devoted his life to defining democracy, neverthe-
less suggests for the purposes of one of his books that "we can get along adequately with the
notion of democracy as 'rule by the people,' or, to narrow down the idea a bit more, as rule by
a demos, a citizen body consisting of members who are considered equals for purposes of
arriving at governmental decisions." ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 83
(1989).
2. Various authors have various names for these networks; in my terminology they are
a subset of the larger and growing phenomenon of "government networks": networks of dif-
ferent types of government institutions from courts to legislatures. See Anne-Marie Slaughter,
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government officials exchanging information, coordinating national
policies, and working together to address common problems . For some,
they herald a new and attractive form of global governance, enhancing the
ability of states to work together to address common problems without the
centralized bureaucracy of formal international institutions. For others,
however, these networks portend a vast technocratic conspiracy, a
shadowy world of regulators bent on "de-politicizing" global issues in
ways that will inevitably benefit the rich and powerful at the expense of
the poor and weak.'
This essay seeks to broaden our understanding of government net-
works by placing them in more historical context and by elaborating
different types of government networks within and without traditional in-
ternational institutions. After a brief overview of the literature on
transgovernmentalism since the 1970s in Part I, Part H sets forth a typol-
ogy of three different categories of government networks. Part III then
seeks to pinpoint the specific accountability concerns associated with each
type. Part IV offers one approach to answering some current accountabil-
ity concerns by adapting the concept of "information agencies" from the
European Union to the global level. This analysis rests on a claim of simi-
larity between global government networks and a number of EU
governance structures, primarily the "comitology" system and related
transgovernmental and public-private networks. Finally, building on the
The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183-97 [hereinafter The Real
New World Order]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1103-24 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Frag-
mented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. U. L. REV. 1014 (1996-97)
[hereinafter Networks in International Economic Integration]; Sol Picciotto, Fragmented
States and International Rules of Law, 6 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997) [hereinafter Frag-
mented States]; Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World: Issues
for Government, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 15 (1994); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in THE
ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 177 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Gov-
erning the Global Economy]; The Real New World Order, supra note 2; THOMAS RISSE-
KAPPEN, COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES 38 (1995) (defining "transgovernmental coali-
tions" as "transboundary networks among subunits of national governments forming in the
absence of central and authoritative national decisions").
4. The Real New World Order, supra note 2, at 185; Governing the Global Economy,
supra note 3, at 179-80. I continue to argue the merits of this form of governance; however, I
am increasingly aware of the actual and potential problems associated with these networks.
Hence, the importance of focusing on accountability.
5. See, e.g., Fragmented States, supra note 3, at 273 (arguing that "dispersal of politics
[into] functional arenas ... appears to allow particular issues to be regulated in a depoliti-
cized, technocratic manner, by managers or professionals who are directly accountable to their
'customers' "); see also Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 3, at
1037.
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same premise, Part V briefly surveys some of the more fundamental
reconceptualizations of democracy and distills various elements of these
visions that could be useful in strengthening the democratic pedigree of
government networks. It concludes with an appeal to add global legisla-
tive networks to the pluralist mix of global governance mechanisms.
I. A SHORT AND SELECTIVE HISTORY
OF TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM
Analysts have spent more time identifying and labeling government
networks than distinguishing among them. They are typically identified
as part of the larger phenomenon of "transnationalism." Philip Jessup
introduced international lawyers to "transnational law" in 1958, defining
it as "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are
other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories."6
Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts later translated this concept into a case-
book, collecting materials designed to bridge the gap between the
domestic and international legal world .
Political scientists embraced transnational relations somewhat later,
in the late 1960s and 1970s, acknowledging the plethora of non-
traditional actors in the international system and trying to relate them
both to states and international organizations. The theoretical debate ini-
tially focused on whether to define transnationalism in terms of the
identity of the actors or the nature of the activity. In an influential edited
volume, TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS, Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye defined transnational relations as "contacts,
coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled
by the central foreign policy organs of governments."8
6. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). In footnote 3 of the first chapter,
Jessup cites Joseph Johnson as one of the originators of the term in an address of June 15,
1955, to the Harvard Foundation.
7. HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS XV-XVi
(2d ed. 1976). Steiner and Vagts built on Jessup's broad definition and focused on topics in-
cluding aspects of national legal systems dealing with principles and procedures for decision-
making that have been specifically developed to regulate problems with some foreign element.
The relevant participants in transnational activity include private individuals or firms, national
courts or legislators or treaty-makers, governmental instrumentalities, international officials,
and regional and international organizations. Id. at xvii.
8. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS xi (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert
0. Keohane eds., 1972) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS]. They identify a separate
subset of "international interactions" as "the movement of tangible or intangible items across
state boundarias when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmen-
tal organization. Id. at xii-xvi.
1044 [Vol. 24:1041
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In an article several years later, Nye and Keohane explicitly distin-
guished "transgovernmental" activity from the broader category of
transnational activity, defining "transgovernmental relations" as "sets of
direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not
controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief ex-
ecutives of those governments."9 They quoted Francis Bator for the
proposition that "[i]t is a central fact of foreign relations that business is
carried on by the separate departments with their counterpart bureaucra-
cies abroad, through a variety of informal as well as formal
connections."'" Their principal interest in this article was to identify the
various ways in which the existence of transgovernmental politics, as
well as transnational politics, offered ways for international organiza-
tions to play an important role in world politics." Nevertheless, they
identified different types of transgovernmental activity-policy coordi-
nation and coalition-building-specified the conditions under which
transgovernmental networks are most likely to form, and specified dif-
ferent types of interactions between international organizations and
transgovernmental networks.
Prominent international relations theorists largely lost interest in
transnational and transgovernmental relations during the 1980s and early
1990s, as interest focused on security studies and inter-state "regimes."
Events over the course of the 1990s, however, cast a spotlight on a new
generation of transgovernmental networks. As the bipolar state system of
the Cold War disappeared and non-state, substate, and supranational
actors rode the tide of globalization, pundits and many scholars began
heralding the era of complex, multi-level, global governance, tied
together by networks. 2 Early on, Peter Haas explored the role and power
9. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and Interna-
tional Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974) [hereinafter Transgovernmental
Relations]. They included in their definition the increased communication between govern-
mental agencies and business carried on by separate departments with their counterpart
bureaucracies abroad. Id. at 41-42. By contrast, a meeting of heads-of-state at which new
initiatives are taken was still the paradigm of the state-centric (interstate) model. Id. at 43-44.
Compare their earlier depiction of traditional "interstate" relations, in which "actors are be-
having in conformity to roles specified or reasonably implied by the formal foreign policy
structure of the state." TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 383.
10. U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for the Organization of the Executive
Branch: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong. 110-11 (1972) (statement of Francis M. Bator, Professor of Politi-
cal Economy, Harvard University), quoted in Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 9, at
42.
I1. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 9, at 42.
12. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN
WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); JAMES N. ROSENAU,
ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT
WORLD (1997); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999). For an
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of "epistemic communities," which he defined as networks "of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within
that domain or issue-area."'3 Later work absorbed the insights about the
power of shared learning and knowledge production generated by the
epistemic communities literature, but focused on more concrete and
observable organizational forms. A number of convergent factors focused
growing attention on the more specific phenomenon of transgovernmental
regulatory networks.
First were observable changes in the organization and activities of
national financial regulators. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion was created in 1974 and is now composed of the representatives of
thirteen central banks that regulate the world's largest banking markets.1
4
Between 1975 and 1992, it issued the Basle Concordat, with several sets
of subsequent amendments, to enhance cooperation between regulators
of multinational banks by dividing specified tasks between home country
and host country regulators. In 1988 the Basle Committee issued a set of
capital adequacy standards to be adopted by all its members as the new
regulatory standard within their countries, which had a sharp impact on
the availability of credit in the world's most important economies." The
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) emerged
in 1984, followed in the 1990s by the creation of the International Asso-
ciation of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and a network of all three of these
organizations and other national and international officials responsible for
financial stability around the world called the Financial Stability Forum.'6
excellent review of much of the governance literature, see Gerry Stoker, Governance as
Theory: Five Propositions, 155 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 17 (1998). For an influential discussion of
multi-level governance within the EU, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Community and Autonomy: Multi-
level Policy-making in the European Union, I J. EUR. PuB. POL'Y 219 (1994).
13. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-
ordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992); see also Special Issue, Knowledge, Power, and
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. I (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992); PETER M.
HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (1990).
14. The members of the Basle Committee come from Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited June 28, 2003).
15. TONY PORTER, STATES, MARKETS AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 3 (1993); see
also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of Interna-
tional Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 281, 284 (1998).
16. The Financial Stability Forum was initiated by the Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Seven industrial countries in February 1999, following a report
on international cooperation and coordination in the area of financial market supervision and
surveillance by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. In addition to representatives from the
Basle Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS, its members include senior representatives from national
authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centers;
1046 [Vol. 24:1041
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As a number of scholars point out, these "organizations" do not fit the
model of an organization held either by international lawyers or political
scientists: they are not composed of states and constituted by treaty; they
do not enjoy legal personality; they have no headquarters or stationery.'7
According to Sol Picciotto, however, they "form part of a more general
shift from 'government' to 'governance,' involving the delegation or
transfer of public functions to particularized bodies, operating on the
basis of professional or scientific techniques." 8
A second major impetus for the study of transgovernmental net-
works has been the emergence of a new "multi-layered regulatory
system," concentrated among Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries.' 9 These governments have had to
respond to deepening economic and financial integration and increasing
interdependence across a wide range of issues by developing strategies
for regulatory cooperation and rapprochement. Transgovernmental net-
works have proliferated in response to these needs. However, as an
OECD study concluded in 1994, the new forms of governance necessary
to make regulatory cooperation work cannot simply follow function.
They must instead be managed within a principled framework designed
not only to improve their effectiveness and the quality of their output,
but also to "protect democratic processes."2°
Third, the most concentrated site for multilevel governance, and
particularly transgovernmental regulatory interactions, is the EU itself. In
the wake of the completion of the single market in 1992, the EU has
emerged as a "regulatory state," exercising power through rule-making
rather than taxing and spending.2' In response to the challenges of trying to
harmonize or at least reconcile the regulations of its diverse and growing
members, the EU has developed a system of "regulation by networks,"
located in the Council of Ministers and closely connected to the complex
process of "comitology" that surrounds Council decision-making. The
international financial institutions such as the BIS, the IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank; and
committees of central bank experts. See International Monetary Fund, A Guide to Committees,
Groups, and Clubs: A Factsheet, at http://www.imforg/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm (last
modified Apr. 2003). For a discussion of additional networks created by the Basle Committee,
IOSCO, and IAIS, such as the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates and the Year 2000
Network, see Governing the Global Economy, supra note 3, at 186-88.
17. See Zaring, supra note 15, at 305-07; see also PORTER, supra note 15, at 4-5.
18. Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 3, at 1039.
19. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 20.
20. Id. at 20, 35-36.
21. Giandomenico Majone, The European Community as a Regulatory State, in 5 COL-
LECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 321, 340 (Academy of European Law
ed., 1994).
22. Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role
of European Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 246, 254 (1997).
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question now confronting a growing number of legal scholars and
political theorists is how decision-making by networks of national
regulators fits with varying national models of European democracy.23
Fourth is the emergence of a system of "transatlantic governance" to
help foster and manage the increasingly dense web of transatlantic eco-
24nomic cooperation. Although transatlantic regulatory relations may
seem only a subset of the larger multilayered regulatory system just dis-
cussed, they take place within the framework of a number of specific
initiatives launched by heads of state. As described by Mark Pollack and
Gregory Shaffer, transatlantic governance involves cooperation at the
inter-governmental level, the transgovernmental level, and the transna-
tional level.2 ' The evolution of transatlantic relations over the course of
the 1990s has thus spawned questions concerning the inter-relationship
and relative importance of these three levels.26
Finally, transgovernmental networks play an important role in sev-
eral recent and still actively debated theories of compliance with
international rules. Abram and Antonia Chayes and Harold Koh have
emphasized the importance of regular interaction, dialogue, and "jaw-
boning" among networks of government officials at both the
international and transnational levels.27 Both theories penetrate the tradi-
tional black box of the state to focus on the activities of specific
government institutions and officials.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
Based on this earlier work and current empirical observation, it is
possible to identify three different types of transnational regulatory
23. Previous work on this subject, often in the context of the European Union, includes
Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997);
Christian Joerges & Jurgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Politi-
cal Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273 (1997) [hereinafter
The Constitutionalisation of Comitology]; J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:
"Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRA-
TION (1999). For an excellent range of arguments by many of the authors engaged in these
debates through the 1990s, see the articles collected in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULA-
TION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999) [hereinafter Joerges &
Vos].
24. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and
Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 3-5
(Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001).
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 7.
27. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203-
04 (1996); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 278-82 (1995).
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networks, based on the different contexts in which they arise and
operate. First are those networks of national regulators that develop
within the context of established international organizations. Second are
networks of national regulators that develop under the umbrella of an
overall agreement negotiated by heads of state. Third are the networks
that have attracted the most attention over the past decade: networks of
national regulators that develop outside any formal framework. These
networks arise spontaneously from a need to work together to address
common problems; in some cases members interact sufficiently
autonomously to require the institutionalization of their activities in their
own transgovernmental regulatory organizations."
These three types are inter-linked in many ways. Some may seem
such a standard part of the international furniture as to be beneath notice;
others compete directly with actual or possible international organiza-
tions. But for present purposes, each raises different accountability
problems. Hence it is valuable to develop this typology as a first step
toward pinpointing precisely what "lack of accountability" means in this
context and what specific steps might be taken to address it.
A. Government Networks Within
International Organizations
What's new? National government officials have always networked
within international organizations; once the heads of state have gone
home, the task of actually getting on with the mission of a particular
institution, however fragile and sketchy, falls to the national government
officials in the issue area concerned. Indeed, depending on the issue area,
they often play a role before the creation of the institution-U.S.
Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White was certainly present at Bretton
Woods.29 But certainly once an institution has been established, whether
to regulate international labor issues, environmental protection, health
issues, international criminal activity, or the sprawling and increasingly
untidy global markets, it will fall to the national ministries or agencies
charged with the particular issue area in question to work with the
nascent international secretariat officially charged to represent the
organization's interests.
Keohane and Nye describe networks of government ministers within
international organizations as emblematic of the "club model" of
28. Zaring refers to these as "international financial regulatory organizations." Zaring,
supra note 15, at 285.
29. RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGINS AND THE
PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 305 (1969).
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international institutions. ° Within a particular inter-governmental
institution established by treaty, "cabinet ministers or the equivalent,
working in the same issue-area, initially from a relatively small number
of relatively rich countries, got together to make rules. Trade ministers
dominated GATT; finance ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign
ministers met at NATO; central bankers at the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS)."'' This mode of operation was very efficient for
participating governments because the relatively small and like-minded
number of ministers involved came to form a negotiating "club" in
which they reached agreements and then reported them to national
legislatures and publics."
The OECD is perhaps the quintessential example of transgovern-
mental regulatory networking within an established international
institution. Its primary function, at least in recent decades, has been to
convene government officials in specific issue areas for the purpose of
addressing a common problem and making recommendations or prom-
ulgating a model code for its solution.33 As discussed above, the EU
Council of Ministers operates the same way, although Council members
exercise actual decision-making power. Finally, in some cases, the secre-
tariat of an international institution deliberately encourages the
formation of a network of officials from specific governments to act as a
negotiating vanguard in developing new rules ultimately designed to ap-
ply to all members.
30. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation
and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy (paper prepared for the American Political Science
Convention, Washington, D.C., Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2000), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
prg/nye/clubmodel.pdf (last visited May 5, 2003) [hereinafter The Club Model].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. For an excellent brief overview of the OECD's origins and current activities, see
James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 776-83
(2000). The OECD website is also a rich source of information. See, e.g., Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Overview of the OECD, at http://www.oecd.org
(on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
34. See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in Interna-
tional Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 277 (2001) (describing deliberate creation of a negotiating network of the intel-
lectual property officials of selected countries); see also Transgovernmental Relations, supra
note 9, at 54 (describing the ways in which international organizations "facilitate face-to-face
meetings among officials in 'domestic' agencies of different governments"; suggesting that
"[s]trategically-minded secretariats of international organizations could ... plan meetings"
with an eye to encouraging such contacts; and identifying several networks involving both




B. Government Networks Within the Framework
of an Executive Agreement
The second type of transgovernmental network is more striking as a
form of governance, in that it emerges outside a formal international in-
stitution. Nevertheless, the members of these networks operate within a
framework agreed on at least by the heads of their respective govern-
ments. A prime recent example is transatlantic transgovernmental
interactions specifically authorized and encouraged by executive agree-
ment. Pollack and Shaffer chronicle a series of executive agreements
between the U.S. President and the President of the EU Commission to
foster increased cooperation, including the Transatlantic Declaration of
1990, the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 (with a Joint US-EU Action
Plan attached), and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership agreement of
1998." Each of these agreements spurred "ad hoc meetings between
lower-level officials, as well as among business enterprises and ... envi-
ronmental and consumer activist groups" regarding "issues of common
concern. 3 6 Many of these networks of lower level officials were emerg-
ing anyway, for functional reasons, but they undoubtedly received a
boost from agreements at the top.
Another example is the web of transgovernmental networks among
financial officials that have emerged as the pragmatic answer to calls for
a "new financial architecture for the twenty-first century" in the wake of
the Russian and East Asian financial crises of 1997 and 1998."7 Notwith-
standing a wide range of proposals from academics and policymakers,
including one for a global central bank,38 what actually emerged was a
set of financial reform proposals from the G-22 that were subsequently
endorsed by the G-7 (now the G-8).3 9 The United States pushed for the
formation of the G-22 in 1997 to create a transgovernmental network of
officials from both developed and developing countries, largely to
counter the Eurocentric bias of the G-7, the Basle Committee, and the
IMF's "interim committee," which is itself a group of finance ministers . 40
35. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 24, at 14-17.
36. Id. at 17.
37. William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, in 2 PUBLIC PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1572, 1573 (1999).
Clinton was echoing calls by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to build a "new Bretton Woods
for the next millennium." Global Finance. Don't Wait Up, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Oct 3, 1998, at
83.
38. Jeffrey E. Garten, Needed: A Fed for the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at A29.
Two economists, John Eatwell and Lance Taylor, also proposed a World Financial Authority.
Global Finance. Don't Wait Up, supra note 37.
39. Robert Chote, A World in the Woods, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 1998, at 20.
40. Global Finance. Don't Wait Up, supra note 37. President Clinton and other leaders
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) announced the creation of the Group of 22, on a
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The East Asian countries most affected were happy to leave the details of
financial reform to the G-22, in lieu of any grander vision. In addition,
a number of the more sweeping reform proposals advanced suggested
the formation of still other networks-a G-16 or a G-15.42
The actual work done within these networks-policy recommenda-
tions, new sets of standards, model codes-is done by finance ministers,
securities regulators, central bankers, and other officials responsible for
different aspects of national economic policy. But they are again con-
vened and approved by heads of state, often simply through informal
agreement or joint communiqu6. In fact, when the G-7 issued a state-
ment on global economic reform in October 1998, the statement itself
was issued by finance ministers and central bank governors, accompa-
nied by a parallel statement from heads of government.43
C. Spontaneous Government Networks-Agencies on the Loose?
In 1974, Keohane and Nye wondered "whether the common interests
of central bankers in a stable currency system have been implemented as
fully by transgovernmental contacts as they might have been."" In 2001,
the complaint is the opposite. The transgovernmental regulatory net-
works that have spurred the greatest concern are those that have emerged
outside formal inter-governmental agreements, whether treaties or ex-
ecutive agreements. The Basle Committee is the leading suspect. The
image of national regulators coming together of their own volition and
regularizing their interactions either as a network or a networked organi-
zation raises the specter of agencies on the loose.
These spontaneous networks themselves divide into two further
categories. First are the networks that institutionalize themselves as
transgovernmental regulatory organizations. The founding and desig-
nated members of these organizations are domestic agencies, or even
temporary basis, at their meeting in Vancouver in November 1997. It was to be a group of
"finance ministers and central bank governors to advance the reform of the architecture of the
global financial system." The original members included finance ministers and central bank
governors from the G-7 countries plus 15 emerging market countries (Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). It subsequently evolved into the G-33 and then the G-20.
International Monetary Fund, supra note 16.
41. APEC's Family Feud, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Nov. 21, 1998, at 41.
42. Jeffrey Sachs proposed the creation of a G-16, composed of the G-8 plus "eight
counterparts from the developing world." The group "would not seek to dictate to the world,
but to establish the parameters for a renewed and honest dialogue." Jeffrey Sachs, Making It
Work, ECONOMIST (U.S.), Sept. 12, 1998, at 23. Jeffrey Garten proposed a G-15 (the G-8 plus
7) to monitor the actions of a new global central bank. Garten, supra note 38.
43. Chote, supra note 39.
44. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 9, at 5 I.
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sub-national agencies such as provincial or state regulators. The organi-
zations themselves tend to operate with a minimum of physical and legal
infrastructure. Most lack a foundational treaty and operate under only a
few agreed upon objectives or bylaws. Nothing they do purports to be
legally binding on the members, and there are typically few or no
mechanisms for formal enforcement or implementation. Rather, these
functions are left to the members themselves.
The second category comprises agreements between domestic
regulatory agencies of two or more nations. The last few decades have
witnessed the emergence of a vast network of such agreements
effectively institutionalizing channels of regulatory cooperation between
specific countries. These agreements embrace principles that can be
implemented by the regulators themselves; they do not need further
approval by national legislators. Widespread use of Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) and of even less formal initiatives has sped the
growth of transgovernmental interaction exponentially, in contrast to the
lethargic pace at which traditional treaty negotiations proceed. Further,
while these agreements are most commonly bilateral arrangements, they
may also evolve into plurilateral arrangements, offering greater scope but
less formality than traditional transgovernmental organizations.
III. PINPOINTING ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS
Transgovemmental interactions within each of these three categories
raise distinct, if often inter-related, accountability concerns. Accountabil-
ity itself is such a complex concept, with many different definitions in
different contexts and according to different political theories, that it
makes little sense to address it apart from specific factual situations. 46 It
can stand for democracy, legitimacy, control, responsiveness, and many
other attributes of an ideal government or governance structure.
Nevertheless, the umbrella of "accountability" captures a core
central point. Keohane and Nye put it sharply: "Even in democratic
societies, the borderline between legitimate transgovernmental behavior
and treason may be unclear.' 47 Can voters be sure that their government
officials are in fact advancing their interests versus the interests of
citizens of other polities? Or are their interests perhaps best advanced if
the officials of their government charged with responsibility for a
specific issue area make common cause with their counterparts abroad?
45. Zaring, supra note 15, at 287.
46. See Robert 0. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the
Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1123 (2003).
47. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 9, at 49.
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This section will try to identify specific accountability concerns as
precisely as possible within each category. It will focus on responses to
these concerns primarily in the third category of transgovernmental
networks outside the framework of a treaty or an executive agreement.
A. The Accountability of Transgovernmental Interaction
Within International Organizations
The traditional working assumption about international organiza-
tions has been that if they are duly established by treaty, with the
attendant national ratification procedures, then they exercise only dele-
gated powers from the member states and do not raise any formal
accountability concerns. That is not to say that they do not arouse suspi-
cion, often intense suspicion, among certain domestic constituencies in
member states. Within the United States, for instance, the UN has been
accused of mounting a fleet of "black helicopters" to threaten loyal U.S.
citizens.4' But both the executive and the legislatures of participating
states have had to approve the organization's activities and can at least
theoretically withdraw this approval by restricting funding or even with-
drawing from the treaty.
In practice, of course, as Keohane and Nye again pointed out in
1974, international organizations can be vital sites for different
government officials, including heads of state, to form policy coalitions
with their foreign counterparts to strengthen their hand in domestic
bureaucratic struggles.4'9 The impact of the international organization is
to "transform potential or tacit coalitions into explicit ones," as well as to
form alliances between an organization's secretariat and relevant
national officials. ° They argued that the existence of the international
organization itself symbolized member governments' recognition of the
need for cooperation and joint decision-making in a particular area and
hence helped to legitimize transgovernmental activity.5'
By 2000, public doubts and suspicion about the activities of at least
certain international organizations had increased sharply, often due pre-
cisely to the perception of elite transgovernmental interactions taking
place within them. The "club model" had broken down, due to a combi-
nation of factors including the increasing intensity and changing nature
of interdependence, the expansion of clubs to include a wide range of
developing countries, and the rise of non-state actors in global politics.
52
48. See John M. Goshko, U.N. Becomes Lightning Rod for Rightist Fears, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1996, at Al.
49. Transgovernmental Relations, supra 9, at 50-55.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id. at50.
52. The Club Model, supra note 30, at 7-8.
1054 [Vol. 24:1041
Global Governance
In response, organizations from the WTO to the UN to the OECD have
instituted a raft of "outreach efforts" to global civil society, enhancing
transparency, hosting NGO meetings, and acknowledging and promoting
"global policy networks."53 Thus far, these efforts have not been
enough-the organizations themselves may simply prove too tempting a
target for their detractors. But, in these cases, the transgovernmental ac-
tivity within these organizations and the activity of the organization itself
seem indistinguishable; hence, the issue is much larger than can be ad-
dressed here.
B. Transgovernmental Activity Within the
Framework of Executive Agreements
Transgovernmental networks within the framework of executive
agreements are often less visible than transgovernmental networks
within established institutions. Further, the very fact of their creation by
executive agreement rather than treaty means that they have not been
approved by the legislature, even prospectively. And the legitimacy pro-
vided by head of state approval may be negated if heads of state
themselves are engaging in "transgovernmental collusion."
John Peterson finds evidence of exactly such collusion in his study
of US-EU efforts to implement a New Transatlantic Agenda in the
1990s. 4 He argues that American and European COGs (chiefs of gov-
ernment) have colluded with one another to reward some domestic
interest groups over others.5 Further, "a central ambition of the New
Transatlantic Agenda ... is to manufacture the same sort of complicity
between administrations and societies, as distinct from intergovernmen-
tal elites, through new transgovernmental and transnational exchanges. 56
Pollack and Shaffer agree, noting that the entire set of transatlantic ini-
tiatives can be understood as a joint effort between the U.S.
administration and the EU Commission to "institutionalize their joint
53. These efforts are clearly evident with the advent of special NGO offerings on or-
ganization websites. See, e.g., http://www.wto.org/english/fonims-e/ngo-e/intr° e.htm (last
visited July 28, 2003). Additionally, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan devoted a section of
the Millennium Report to the emergence of global policy networks. See KOFI A. ANNAN, 'WE
THE PEOPLES': THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY at 70, U.N. Doc.
DPI/2103, U.N. Sales No. E.00.1.16 (2000).
54. See John Peterson, Get Away from Me Closer You're Near Me Too Far: Europe and
America after the Uruguay Round, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY, supra note 24, at 45, 45-72.
55. See id. at 46.
56. Id.
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preference" for more transatlantic and global trade liberalization, as well
as to strengthen key domestic constituencies."
Such accounts can legitimately raise fear and concern among disfa-
vored domestic constituencies, in this case consumers, environmentalists,
and labor. When the head of state throws his or her power behind some
kinds of transgovernmental (and transnational) contacts but not others,
without legislative input, it can seriously tilt the domestic political playing
field. Observers could draw a similar conclusion from the practice, noted
above, of accompanying a statement by finance ministers and central
bankers with a parallel statement by heads of government. These interac-
tions by heads of state and the transgovernmental relations resulting
from them are analogous, at least for the US and the EU Commission, to
the domestic innovation of "presidential administration," whereby the
head of state controls the political agenda by executive degree rather
than collaborative legislation." The response to the resulting account-
ability concerns is likely to be legislative, prodded by the disaffection of
outmaneuvered domestic constituencies.
C. Spontaneous Transgovernmental Networks
Transgovernmental networks that arise outside the framework of in-
ternational organizations and executive agreements are most likely to
spawn fears of runaway technocracy. That a regulatory agency would
reach out on its own account to its foreign counterparts, even in an effort
to solve common problems, raises the possibilities not only of policy
collusion, whereby transgovernmental support can be marshaled against
domestic bureaucratic opponents, but also of the removal of issues from
the domestic political sphere through deliberate technocratic de-
politicization.59
A wide range of possible measures can combat these perceptions and
enhance public awareness of and even participation in spontaneous
57. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC Gov-
ERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 287, 295.
58. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
59. See Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 3, at 1037. On the
other hand, it is also possible that spontaneous networks can be less threatening due to their
very flexibility and ability to incorporate only like-minded members. Networks within the
framework of treaty-based international organizations and executive agreements incorporate
officials from all the governments party to the treaty or the agreement, regardless of whether
their interests converge on any set of specific issues. Spontaneous networks, by contrast,
should arise where the government officials involved, at least, immediately perceive a benefit
in developing closer ties with foreign counterparts who share their views or face common
problems. The question still remains, however, whether the officials in question are not simply
seeking foreign reinforcements for domestic bureaucratic battles in ways that skew outcomes
away from the preferences of the median domestic voter. That is a very hard empirical ques-
tion to address; it remains unanswered.
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networks. Creating well-serviced websites can make a network real by
making it virtual.6° The following two sections propose additional steps
toward enhanced transparency and popular accountability: creating the
global equivalent of EU "information agencies" and encouraging the
formation of legislative networks, perhaps of representatives of key
legislative committees, to share information and coordinate efforts to
pass parallel domestic legislation.6 ' Alternatively, as is already happening
in many cases, transgovernmental networks can be folded into larger
"mixed networks" of governmental and private actors.62
Another quite different response to accountability concerns regard-
ing spontaneous networks is the claim that they do not exercise actual
power; they are mere "talking shops." With a few exceptions such as the
Basle Committee, participants in these networks cannot actually make
rules or adopt policies. They can only disseminate information and bring
back recommendations and even proposals for consideration through the
normal domestic legislative or agency rule-making process.
This view of transgovernmental networks is short-sighted. It misses a
key dimension of the exercise of power in the Information Age. The "talk-
ing shops" generate compilations of best practices, codes of conduct, and
templates for everything from a Memorandum of Understanding to an en-
vironmental assessment review. As a senior official from the World Bank
has recently noted, the dissemination of information has played a far
greater role in triggering policy convergence in various issue areas than
more deliberate and coercive attempts."
This result is not surprising. In a world awash with information,
credible and authoritative information is at a premium.' Even more
valuable is a distillation and evaluation of information from many
different sources. Recommended rules and practices compiled by a
global body of securities regulators or environmental officials offer a
focal point for convergence. Equally important, they offer a kind of safe
60. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Virtual Visibility, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 84,
85.
61. See Governing the Global Economy, supra note 3, at 197 (describing existing legis-
lative networks). For a more general discussion of all these mechanisms aimed at enhancing
accountability, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Net-
works Accountable, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND
POLITICAL PROSPECTS 521 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
62. See Pollack & Shaffer, Who Governs?, supra note 57, at 301-05.
63. Andres Rigo, paper presented at the Conference on The Evolution of Legal Sys-
tems, Bijuralism and International Trade, University of Ottawa Law School, Oct. 20-21, 2000
(on file with author).
64. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Infor-
mation Age, FOREIGN AFF. Sept./Oct. 1998, at 81.
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harbor for officials the world over looking for guidance and besieged
with consultants.
Yet, should government officials be held accountable for either dis-
seminating or using information? As new forms of global governance
emerge wielding informational power, and probably engaging in new
forms of informational politics, the very concept of accountability-even
accepting its current complexity-must grow and change. These are
questions not only for lawyers and public policy makers, but also for
political theorists.
IV. GLOBAL INFORMATION AGENCIES
At this juncture, the EU offers a deceptively simple source of analo-
gies and potential institutional solutions to the general problem of
enhancing the accountability of government networks. Lawyers and po-
litical scientists studying the EU have spent much of the past decade
grappling with the growing phenomenon of "comitology"-the extraor-
dinarily complex web of committees that play advisory, management,
and regulatory functions in between the European Commission and the
Council of Ministers.65 Although the leading scholars in these debates
have different positive understandings and normative evaluations of
comitology, they all agree that it is a critical and distinctive dimension of
EU governance that must be addressed in any effort to promote constitu-
tionalism and democracy within the EU as an institution and/or an
emerging polity.
The next section explores some of the larger implications of debates
over comitology for arguments over the accountability of global gov-
ernment networks. To understand the relevance of these debates,
however, it is first necessary to delve a bit deeper into the distinctions be-
tween different types of EU institutions and government networks as
defined here. The European Community (EC), one of the pillars of the EU,
has a number of different types of committees: scientific committees, in-
terest committees, and policy-making/implementation committees.66
Many of these committees must be consulted as part of the Community
legislative process. The policy-making/implementation committees are
the most powerful of these committees; they are composed of represen-
tatives of the Member States from the different issue areas under
65. For an excellent overview of the complexities of comitology, see Ellen Vos, EU
Committees: The Evolution of Unforeseen Institutional Actors in European Product Regula-
tion, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 19.
66. Id. at 22.
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consideration: agriculture, transport, health, etc.67 In terms of membership
and structure, these committees most resemble networks of national
government officials charged with responsibility for a particular issue
area. However, as the semantic distinction between "committee" and
"network" suggests, the committees are more tightly structured and have
a specific charge and function within a larger governance structure: spe-
cifically, mediating between a supranational entity, the Commission, and
an inter-governmental one, the Council. They are theoretically responsi-
ble for ensuring that the views of the different EC Member States are
fully and powerfully represented in the legislative process.68
The EC also has agencies and more informal networks of both pub-
lic and private actors. Agencies are entities with legal personality and
their own administrative structure. 69 Networks, as used in EC parlance,
typically describe the looser and more informal interactions between
national government officials that are increasingly necessary to imple-
ment EC policies.70 According to two prominent EU scholars,
Giandomenico Majone and Renaud Dehousse, the relationship between
these two types of governance structures is the wave of the future in the
EC. Together they are best poised to exploit the potential of "regulation
by information." This conception of both the substance and form of gov-
ernance within the EU parallels many of the perceptions and insights
that animate the description of government networks as an emerging
form of global governance. Indeed, closer examination of this line of
scholarship yields a European proposal that can be transposed fairly eas-
ily to the global context: the creation of global information agencies.
Majone, who pioneered the concept of the EU as a "regulatory
state"' 7' distinguishes regulation by information from direct regulation,
which relies on a variety of "command and control techniques" such as
orders and prohibitions. Regulation by information operates instead by
attempting "to change behaviour indirectly, either by changing the struc-
ture of incentives of the different policy actors, or by supplying the same
actors with suitable information."73 Simply having access to credible in-




69. Id. at 32 n.47.
70. See Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The
Role of European Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 246, 254 (1997).
71. Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y 139 (1997).
72. Giandomenico Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information, 4
J. EUR. PUB. Po' 262, 265 (1997).
73. Id.
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Dehousse links the concept of regulation by information to the EU
phenomenon of "regulation by networks. 74 He sees regulation by net-
works as the response to a basic paradox in EU governance: "On the one
hand, increased uniformity is certainly needed; on the other hand, greater
centralization is politically inconceivable, and probably undesirable."75
The effort to harmonize national laws within the European Community
(EC) involves the passage of regulations at the Community level but de-
pends on national authorities for their implementation.76 This process is
slow, cumbersome, and invariably spotty.77 It also leaves enormous
power and discretion in the hands of the national regulatory authorities.
The resulting regulatory gaps must be addressed, but how?
The EU alternative is the "transnational option": the use of an organ-
ized network of national officials to ensure "that the actors in charge of
the implementation of Community policies behave in a similar man-
ner."78 Such spontaneous convergence requires that they agree on the
definition of a common problem and the range of possible responses,
which in turn depends on their access to comparable data and expert
opinions." In short, they need to proceed on a base of mutual informa-
tion.
These same officials meet together within the framework of comi-
tology. Yet Dehousse has a larger phenomenon in mind: the functional
need for mid-level officials from national ministries in different issue
areas to exchange information with one another and with both Commis-
sion officials and private actors. Dehousse describes these networks in
far more benign terms than do many of his fellow EU observers. Even
for him, however,
ad hoc meetings of national officials, no matter how frequent,
are not enough to bring about a true 'community of views,' let
alone a 'community of action.' Partnership must be structured by
common rules, which lay down the rights and duties of all mem-
bers. Equally important, the network itself must be given some
stability, which generally implies the setting-up of a structure
which will manage the interaction among network members.0
European regulatory agencies fulfill this function. Eight new agen-
cies were created at European level between 1990 and 1997 as a way of
74. Dehousse, supra note 70, at 254-55.
75. Id. at 259.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id. at 249-51.





facilitating further harmonization. Four of these-the European Envi-
ronmental Agency, the Lisbon Drug Monitoring Centre, the European
Agency for Health and Safety at Work, and the European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products-are best described as "information
agencies."8' Their job is to collect, coordinate, and disseminate informa-
tion needed by policymakers. They lack decision-making authority,
much less coercive enforcement power.
Both Majone and Dehousse describe these agencies as easy to
underestimate but actually likely to play an important and powerful role.
Majone sees them as the quintessential example of regulation by
information. Their power will lie not in their coercive apparatus but in
their ability to exercise influence through "knowledge and persuasion.""
He notes a general disenchantment with the "efficacy of [command-and-
control] policy instruments," undermined by factors from increasingly
porous national borders to the growing complexity of public policy.83
"Modes of regulation based on information and persuasion" are
perceived to be more flexible, responsive, and effective. 84 To be
successful in this environment, an information agency needs to establish
its credibility and professional reputation. 
85
Dehousse also sees the European information agencies as network
creators and coordinators. He explains: "Their primary aim is to run
networks of national administrations which come into play in the
implementation of Community policies."87 They accomplish this function
by setting up a "permanent technical and administrative secretariat"
which tries not only to collect and disseminate necessary information but
81. Majone, supra note 71, at 262-63; Dehousse, supra note 70, at 256-57. Article 1
paragraph 4 of the regulation establishing the Lisbon Drug Monitoring Centre specifies: "The
Centre may not take any measure which in any way goes beyond the sphere of information
and the processing thereof." Council Regulation 302/93, art. 1(4), 1993 O.J. (L 36) 1, quoted
in Dehousse, supra note 70, at 256-57. Similarly, the task of the European Environmental
Agency is set forth as follows:
[T]o provide the member states and the Community with information; to collect,
record and assess data on the state of the environment; to encourage harmonization
of the methods of measurement; to promote the incorporation of European envi-
ronmental information into international monitoring programmes; to ensure data
dissemination; to co-operate with other Community bodies and international institu-
tions.
Majone, supra note 71, at 263, adapted from Council Regulation 1210/90, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L
120)1.
82. Majone, supra note 71, at 264.
83. Id. at 267-68.
84. Id. at 269.
85. Id. at 269-71.
86. Dehousse, supra note 70, at 260.
87. Id.
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also to encourage "horizontal cross-fertilization" among counterpart
national officials. 88 From a more dynamic perspective, it appears that the
emergence of transgovernmental networks through the process of
comitology has given rise to the need for a central node, which in turn
helps spur more coordinated and effective transgovernmental action.
Another important virtue of these regulatory agencies, understood as
conveners and coordinators, derives from their projected impact on the
democratic legitimacy of EU regulatory processes. First, they enhance
transparency: "Several agencies are explicitly required to make accessi-
ble to the public the data they collect. Moreover, the provision of
information has generally been broadly construed; it often encompasses
policy analysis and the preparation of measures and legislation in their
field of activity ... ."'9 Second and equally important, they are often
able to expand the transgovernmental network to include private actors
in a particular policy area.90 This activity need not be merely inviting
comment from NGOs of various types as well as regulated entities, but
can also include bringing together all relevant actors and inviting them to
pool information.
The Commission on Environmental Co-operation (CEC), established
under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), takes regulation by information one step farther.9' The CEC is
specifically charged with mobilizing public participation in environ-
mental policymaking by disseminating information. The NAAEC is a
side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement.92 Under its
terms, Canada, the United States, and Mexico granted private parties,
including NGOs, the power to bring a complaint before the CEC against
one of the three states for failure to enforce its environmental laws. 93 The
Secretariat of the CEC decides whether the complaint is sufficiently
credible to warrant the preparation of a "factual record"; if it decides in
the affirmative, the Council of the CEC, composed of the environmental
ministers of all three states, must vote whether to go forward. 94
In the event that the Council votes to authorize preparation of a
factual record, the Secretariat has considerable latitude not only to solicit
information from both the plaintiff and the State party defendant
concerning the charges, but also to develop information from outside
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 256.
91. North American Agreements on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
92. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
296.
93. NAAEC, supra note 91, arts. 14, 15.
94. Id. arts. 15(1), 15(2).
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experts that is relevant to understanding the strength and nature of the
allegations.9 Neither the Secretariat nor the Council of the CEC can
actually reach a legal conclusion as to whether the State party in
question is failing to enforce its environmental laws; however, the
Council of the CEC must vote whether to accept the factual record and
make it public.96 Making it public invites increased public participation
in the enforcement process; the factual record and supporting documents
become strong weapons for NGOs to use in mobilizing domestic public
opinion in favor of stronger domestic enforcement measures."
Why not create global information agencies? In many ways, the
secretariats or technical committees of existing transgovernmental
regulatory organizations such as the Basle Committee or International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) perform some of the
same functions. But, these are essentially ad hoc, organic entities, created
and empowered by networks of national officials to serve various needs as
they arise. Suppose national governments were to come together to create
a global securities agency, or a global environmental agency, but with the
express charge not of arrogating power from national officials, but rather
of providing information to such officials and helping to coordinate
relations among them. Further, these agencies would service not only
transgovernmental networks, but also transnational networks within their
issue areas, working to bring together both private and public actors in a
particular policy sector.
Equating a "global agency," of any kind, with enhancing the democ-
ratic legitimacy of global regulatory processes may seem oxymoronic.
"Agency" conjures automatic images of bureaucratic technocrats and
technocratic bureaucrats. Beyond the stereotypes, however, the proposal
has a number of potential advantages.
First, convening heads of state to establish an international
institution, even one with only informational powers, would highlight the
existence and importance of current transgovernmental networks, helping
to legitimate them by acknowledging them as key elements of a system of
global governance. The purpose of the agency would be to facilitate the
functioning of these networks and to expand them both to other
governments and to private actors as necessary. Notice and approval by
heads of state would also help allay charges of transgovernmental policy
collusion to strengthen the hands of particular national officials in
domestic bureaucratic infighting.
95. Id. art. 15(4).
96. Id. art. 15(7).
97. David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Sub-
mission Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 545, 571 (2000).
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Second, and perhaps paradoxically, the creation of a global entity
would emphasize the national identity of network participants. The
existence of even a small group of international bureaucrats to meet the
needs of national officials can only emphasize the location of actual
decision-making power in national hands. Even if those national officials
are networking with one another to plug growing gaps in national
jurisdiction and to solve common problems, they remain national
officials answerable only to national legislatures and chief executives. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that the European information
agencies have actually resisted an increase in their power over national
officials, perhaps because "instilling a degree of (vertical) hierarchical
control in structures created to promote (horizontal) co-operation among
peers may result in the undermining of the basis of consensus, which is
indispensable for the smooth and efficient operation of the network."9
Third, the appellation "information agency" would focus attention
on whether the collection and cross-fertilization of information is in fact
problematic. How could it be wrong or even worrisome to know more
about what other countries are doing? For many, however, even to pose
the question this way betrays an academic or even technocratic bias. If,
as many critical scholars maintain, "technical" decisions are but a con-
venient way of de-politicizing political decisions with distributional
implications, then models and ideas borrowed helter-skelter from differ-
ent political contexts are likely to prove at best useless and at worst
dangerous. 99 On the other side of the political spectrum, as Justice Scalia
has argued vehemently with regard to the question of whether the U.S.
Supreme Court should take account of ideas and decisions from foreign
courts, foreign transplants contravene basic notions of local democ-
racy.
In the increasingly borderless Information Age, where citizens of
many countries have access to a literal world wide web of information,
this debate seems archaic and almost preposterous. However, it should
be had-openly and directly. If the objections are real and resonate with
a wider public, then existing government networks are on much weaker
ground than previously imagined. Nevertheless, even well short of such a
scenario of willful ignorance, questions of how the information collected
from foreign counterparts is used and disseminated are not only
98. Dehousse, supra note 70, at 255.
99. Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 3, at 1037.
100. Justice Scalia has engaged in an open debate with some of his fellow justices con-
cerning the propriety of looking to foreign decisions, even on an entirely persuasive basis. For
an account of this debate, see Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 2, at 1118.
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legitimate but also necessary. As Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel point
out, regulation by information comes in many different models.'0 '
Fourth, as in the European context, the existence of an information
agency charged with convening and supporting networks of national of-
ficials immediately invites expansion of the network to a host of private
actors. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has recognized the impor-
tance of this function by positioning the U.N. as the convener of "global
policy networks," designed precisely to bring together all public and pri-
vate actors on issues critical to the global public interest. '°2
Transgovernmental and transnational networks currently parallel each
other in many cases and intersect in all sorts of ways, such as the NGO
conferences held together with major inter-governmental conferences on
issues ranging from the environment to women's rights. Nevertheless,
the process is haphazard and in some cases chaotic. Information agen-
cies could provide focus and a minimum degree of organization.
Beyond these functions, it is imaginable that information agencies
could become the focal points for dispute resolution processes designed
to disseminate information and mobilize public participation to check
and correct government performance, as with the CEC. If the basic para-
digm for global regulatory processes is the promulgation of performance
standards, codes of best practices, and other aspirational models based
on compiled comparative information, together with national legislation
taking account of global practice but tailored to individual national cir-
cumstance, then why should citizens not have some means of shaming
their governments into complying with their own rules? The entity
charged with hearing the dispute would have the power only to issue
some kind of informational record, backed by its legitimacy and credibil-
ity. It would be up to national and transnational citizen groups to do the
rest.
These may seem fanciful visions. However, the European Union has
in fact pioneered the paradigm of transgovernmental networks as gov-
ernance structures within a community of states that have come together
for a set of specific purposes. It has also run aground on the questions of
the democratic legitimacy of these structures. To the extent that Euro-
pean information agencies offer at least a partial solution to these
problems, they merit examination on a global scale.
101. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 286-87 (1998).
102. ANNAN, supra note 53, at 70.
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V. DISAGGREGATED DEMOCRACY
Adding another type and even layer of institutions to the existing
patchwork of inter-governmental, transgovernmental, and transnational
global governance structures still seems a rather ad hoc approach to ad-
dressing a fundamental democracy deficit above the level of the nation-
state. As Keohane and Nye observe, it cannot address the more funda-
mental democratic problem, which they identify as a lack of
intermediating politicians directly responsive to the electorate. °3 It is
possible to do better, but only in the context of a rethinking of the ele-
ments of democratic legitimacy. Here, it is helpful to return to the
broader frameworks for democratic governance set forth by scholars
pondering the conundrum of the EU democratic deficit.
These scholars include Giandomenico Majone, Karl-Heinz Ladeur,
Christian Joerges, Jurgen Neyer, Charles Sabel, Joshua Cohen, Oliver
Gerstenberg, Fritz Scharpf, Renaud Dehousse, Gunther Teubner, Joseph
Weiler and many of their co-contributors and critics in various collective
research projects designed to identify and reimagine the structures of EU
governance over the past decade. The debates to date have proceeded
more or less dialectically, with different individuals or teams of scholars
attacking each other and proffering an alternative vision as the only or at
least the best account of democratic legitimation. For the purposes of
this essay, it is particularly important to understand that some of the
strongest claims of a democratic deficit in the EU focus precisely on the
phenomenon of comitology.
Joseph Weiler points out that although the self-appointed guardians
of European democracy have long focused on the supranational features
of the EU, chiefly the Commission and the Court, it is now "time to
worry about infranationalism-a complex network of middle-level
national administrators, Community administrators, and an array of
private bodies with unequal and unfair access to a process with huge
social and economic consequences to everyday life."'3 4 To dramatize the
point, he adds: "Consider that it is even impossible to get from any of the
Community institutions an authoritative and mutually agreed statement
of the mere number of committees which inhabit that world of
comitology."'0'5 Along similar lines, Beate Kohler-Koch reacted with
incredulity to a claim by Christian Joerges and Jurgen Neyer that the
deliberative processes of comitology in fact enhance democracy within
the Community. She retorted: "None other than comitology, that
103. The Club Model, supra note 30, at 13.
104. J.H.H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen-Eros and Civilization, 4 EUR. J. PUB.




notorious system of inter-bureaucratic negotiation-diplomacy that even
parliamentarians wish to abolish in the interest of democracy, is
supposed to bring an element of democratically-legitimated politics into
the Community?"' 6
The networks that comprise comitology differ from the global gov-
ernment networks described here in many ways, not least that they
operate within a self-consciously integrating community of nations that
has delegated a substantial degree of sovereignty to a set of inter-
governmental and supranational institutions. Nevertheless, it is also pos-
sible to identify many similarities, beginning with the desire to achieve
cooperative outcomes at the international level without committing ei-
ther power or personnel to an autonomous international institution.' 07
Most important, the debate about comitology as either a source of or a
solution to the democracy deficit in the EU not only prompts proposals
for specific measures that could be taken on a European or global scale,
it also creates a catalyst for rethinking more fundamental ideas of de-
mocracy in the face of problems and institutions whose scope and scale
seem to defy popular participation or control.
This section offers a brief and sharply simplified overview of some
of the most important positions staked out in the European debate. 0 8 A
longer-term effort to develop a framework within which to understand
and justify the distinctive contribution of global transgovernmental net-
works to global governance is likely to be most successful if it can
synthesize a number of different arguments about the relationship be-
tween government networks and democratic values. As a first step, it is
possible to isolate some of the most important legitimating arguments
about transgovernmentalism (or infranationalism, in Weiler's parlance)
in the EU, including arguments about delegation to independent agen-
cies, the possibilities of deliberative supranationalism, a reimagination of
the essential possibilities of individual self-governance in a heterarchical
society, and democratic experimentalism.
At a very deep level, these different arguments proceed from
different conceptions of democracy. Arguments about delegation to
106. Beate Kohler-Koch, Die Europaeisierung nationaler Demokratien: Verschlei3 eines
europaeischen Kulturerbes? [The Europeanization of National Democracies: Deterioration of
an European Cultural Heritage?], in DEMOKRATIE, EINE KULTUR DES WESTENS? 277 (M. Th.
Greven ed., 1998).
107. John A.E. Vervaele, Shared Governance and Enforcement of European Law: From
Comitology to a Multi-level Agency Structure?, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 137.
108. For a somewhat different typology that nevertheless draws the same basic distinc-
tions between non-majoritarian views, deliberative supranationalism, and post-modern market
regulation, see Michelle Everson's account of three "constitutional" models of the internal
model polity. Michelle Everson, The Constitutionalisation of European Administrative Law:
Legal Oversight of a Stateless Internal Market, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 298-305.
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non-majoritarian institutions and deliberative supranationalism, although
often at loggerheads with one another, nevertheless all proceed from a
fairly traditional conception of vertical representative government, in
which the principal question is how to design state institutions "above"
the citizens they represent to represent them as well as possible. "Post-
modern" arguments about individuals with multiple selves operating in
multiple parallel fora to advance their interests and develop their
identities rest on a more horizontal conception of democracy, a
challenging yet empirically grounded vision of the ways in which self-
government can take place in settings that are neither public nor private
and that exist in a space between hierarchy and anarchy.
In a world in which the basic unit of operation is not a unitary state
but a disaggregated state, meaning that the elements of both government
within the state and governance between and above states are different
government institutions, both conceptions are important. No amount of
post-modern theorizing and prostration before the gods of technology is
likely to displace the very basic concept of electoral accountability on as
small a scale as possible consistent with a minimum level of government
effectiveness. On the other hand, the impossibility of fully "reaggregat-
ing" the state in a tidy democratic package will ultimately require a
much more sophisticated understanding of networks and the interaction
of nodes in a network with each other, whether individual or institu-
tional. A successful synthesis of these two approaches-at least for the
purposes of reconciling many of the functional and ideational needs of
global governance-will be a vision of disaggregated democracy.
A. Vertical Democracy
A first and familiar effort to legitimate transgovernmental networks
is through an appeal to the desirability of de-politicization. In this view,
politics means rent-seeking and deal-making, messy processes that pre-
vent adoption of the "optimal" policy. Insulating specific policy areas by
delegation to independent technical experts will produce much better
outcomes for the society as a whole, reflecting the supposed choices of a
hypothetical median voter.' 9 In addition to this democratic justification,
109. Majone's mode of argument assumes a "right answer" that the public trusts experts
to adopt. Andrew Moravcsik offers an alternative argument from equality, claiming not that
independent agencies will produce correct policies, but rather policies that are closer to the
desires of the median voter or a broad social consensus in favor of equity. Andrew Moravcsik,
Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITI-
MACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 161,
181-82 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); Andrew Moravcsik, Europe's Inte-
gration at Century's End, in CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION? EUROPE FACING THE
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Majone also advances an argument from effectiveness, suggesting, "to-
day the main reason for delegating powers is the need to make credible
policy commitments."
' 10
A second alternative is an updated model of deliberative democracy,
in Habermasian more than Madisonian terms. Christian Joerges and Jir-
gen Neyer originally advanced the concept of "deliberative
supranationalism" as both a normative and a positive paradigm of EU
governance, based on extensive research into the formation of European
foodstuffs policy."' Empirically, they found that government representa-
tives on the various foodstuffs committees do not bargain based on
national positions. Rather, they
not only learn to reduce differences between national legal pro-
visions but also to develop converging definitions of problems
and philosophies for their solution. They slowly proceed from
being representatives of national interests to being representa-
tives of a Europeanized inter-administrative discourse
characterized by mutual learning and an understanding of each
other's difficulties in the implementation of specific solutions."'
Normatively, Joerges and Neyer argued that the EU committee sys-
tem "must be based upon, and controlled by, constitutional provisions
favouring a 'deliberative' style of problem solving.""' 3 The result will be
a "vision of a law of transnational governance, which would avoid both
the pitfalls of intergovernmentalism and of building up a centralised
technocratic governance structure."' "4
Two years later, after responding to many attacks along the lines of
those quoted from Weiler and Kohler-Koch above, Joerges tempered his
original optimism but nevertheless continued to insist on at least the
CHALLENGES OF DEEPENING, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 1, 51 (Andrew Moravcsik ed.,
1998).
110. Majone, supra note 71, at 270.
Ill. The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, supra note 23, at 292-98; Christian Jo-
erges & Jurgen Neyer, Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-solving:
European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 609, 610 (1997) [herein-
after European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector].
112. European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector, supra note I l, at 620. In a later
article, Joerges described the research questions he and Neyer posed to determine the delibera-
tive quality of comitology decision-making as follows: "[d]o those involved start from fixed
positions which they then try as far as possible to push through in the committee meetings, or
are they ready to take critical objections to their views seriously and be persuaded by argu-
ment?"; and "[d]o the discussants recognise standards of argument able to promote the
reaching of a basic consensus, shared by all, on the 'common weal'?" Christian Joerges,
"Good Governance" Through Comitology?, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 319.
113. The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, supra note 23, at 282.
114. Id. at 287.
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possibility of "good governance through comitology.""' 5 Here he offers
deliberative supranationalism as a "normative yardstick" by which to
evaluate the legitimacy of the EU as a multi-level governance system. '
Although he recognizes many problems with the existing comitology
system, he nevertheless insists on the possibility of designing rules and
procedures to establish deliberative politics within transgovernmental
networks. The architects of such a system should seek to structure
"national decision-making processes by the imposition of supranational
standards," particularly designed to check "parochial interests" and
ensure that "foreign concerns" be given equal consideration. ' 7 They
should also seek to establish "transnational 'regimes'" that would be
structured to encourage "deliberative problem-solving procedures"
instead of intergovernmental bargaining."
8
Joseph Weiler, among others, remains unconvinced. He recognizes
the force of Joerges and Neyer's data as supporting a major paradigm
shift, forcing students of the EU decision-making to wrestle with
infranationalism as well as supranationalism and intergovernmental-
ism. " 9 He accepts that infranational decision-making has its own
particular characteristics, including a remarkable degree of autonomy,
polycentricity, administrative and managerial orientation rather than con-
stitutional and diplomatic, and "a modus operandi which is less by
negotiation and more by deliberation."'20 But, in his view, it is definitely
not democratic. It "is a microcosm of the problems of democracy, not a
microcosm of the solution."' 2' It is fatally flawed by the inevitably elitist
identity of the participants in these networks, their corresponding biases
in making vitally important public decisions and their unawareness of
these biases, and the impossibility of creating equal access to these net-
works without destroying the very conditions that make them work as
deliberative bodies.'
22
Note that Joerges never claims that transgovernmental deliberation is
"apolitical" in any way. On the contrary, he rejects the idea of delegation
to "technical" experts on both empirical and theoretical grounds, noting
115. Joerges, "Good Governance" Through Comitology?, supra note 112, at 311.
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id. at 315.
118. Id.
119. J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: "Comitology" as Revolution-Infranationalism, Constitu-
tionalism and Democracy, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 339. Weiler describes this "third
paradigm" as addressing "a meso-level reality which operates below the public macro and
above the individual micro [and] is not a reflection of the State-Community paradigm." Id. at
342.
120. Id. at 342-43.
121. Id. at 349.
122. Id. at 348-49.
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"no national constitutional state has ever given carte blanche to expert
committees" and denying the possibility of a "dichotomy between a-
political social regulation and political distributive politics.' 23 Unlike
Majone, he does not champion comitology networks as insulated from
redistributors or rent-seekers, but rather as places where genuine persua-
sion is possible on the basis of a wider consideration of interests than
purely national ones-a critical element, he argues, for democracy in a
multinational space.
Further, Joerges insists that comitology is not separate from suprana-
tionalism, but rather an unavoidable part of it. It flows ineluctably from
the dependency of the hierarchical elements of the EU system on de-
centralized implementation systems. The participants in these systems
must come together in networks to coordinate, cooperate, and solve
common problems. Without a "supranational central implementation
machinery headed by the Commission," national governments in the EU
are forced into a "co-operative venture."'' 24 Thus, deliberation within
transgovernmental networks is the flipside of a decision not to displace
national officials with a layer of bureaucracy one step further away from
the individuals they regulate.
This last point makes it easier to see how, notwithstanding their dif-
ferences, both Joerges and Majone, as well as Dehousse and others in a
more intermediate position, all assume a basic vertical relationship be-
tween the governors and the governed, the regulators and the regulated
entities. The European level of governance still exists "above" the na-
tional level in some conceptual space; the national level in turn exists
"above" individuals and groups in domestic and transnational society.
The result is a two-tiered representative system in which the fundamental
mechanism of self-government is the election or selection of officials
who formulate and adopt rules that are then transposed back down a
level in their application to the "people.'0
5
B. Horizontal Democracy
A sharply contrasting and much more radical vision is an emerging
horizontal conception of democracy, which imagines self-government as
the product of a much richer set of interactions among individuals and
123. Christian Joerges, Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime and the Dream of
Good Transnational Governance, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 6.
124. The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, supra note 23, at 276.
125. Joerges emphasizes the impossibility of establishing a genuine governmental hier-
archy in the EU, but nevertheless identifies "'hierarchical' elements of the Europeanisation
process" in conjunction with a necessary reliance on de-centralized and horizontal institutions
and structures for problem-solving and implementation of EU regulations. Joerges, "Good
Governance" through Comitology?, supra note 112, at 313.
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groups in both private and public fora. It begins from the empirical fact
of mushrooming "private governance regimes" in which individuals,
groups, and corporate entities in domestic and transnational society gen-
erate the rules, norms, and principles they are prepared to live by.'26 It
also takes account of important innovations in national and international
administrative regulation, in which the elaboration of formal rules is in-
creasingly giving way to "rolling best practice rulemaking."'27 The
challenge is to integrate these regimes into a revised understanding of
public governance. Many different scholars are elaborating this vision in
different ways and are engaged in a lively debate with one another. At
this juncture, however, it is possible to identify three more or less distinct
elements of this type of analysis.
First is a different conception of individual identity, premised not on
a single self but on plural selves. This is a post-modem concept of the
self, in which individuals define different parts of themselves by differ-
entiating themselves from others in multiple contexts.
The second essential element is a conception of how in fact indi-
viduals organize themselves to flourish and solve problems both as
autonomous beings and as members of society. The labels here prolifer-
ate-heterarchy, polyarchy, polycontexturality-but the fundamental
idea is the same. Individuals are able to organize themselves in multiple
networks or even communities that are "disembedded" from traditional
state structures but that are nevertheless "communicatively interdepend-
ent" in the sense of being able to compile and cumulate knowledge,
problem-solving capacity, and normative frameworks. They are self-
organizing, self-transforming, and de-territorialized. A fundamental di-
mension of this vision is the perception that the traditional separation
between the formulation and application of rules is being dissolved by
technology, a development that is in turn undermining "a shared com-
mon knowledge basis of practical experience."'2 8 Instead, public and
private actors are coming together to develop new ways of "decision-
making under conditions of complexity."
29
The third element is a revised conception of the state. Participants in
these multiple, parallel networks, both domestic and transnational, face a
continuous stream of problems and require a continuous stream of
knowledge both about each another and about their counterparts in other
networks. The state's function is not to regulate directly, but rather to
126. Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Sys-
tems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997).
127. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 101, at 352.
128. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Concept of the Network in European Stan-
dard-Setting, in Joerges & Vos, supra note 23, at 156.
129. Id. at 161.
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manage these processes by facilitating prbblem solving and information
pooling.' 30 It must also devise norms and enforcement mechanisms for
assuring the widest possible participation within each network, consis-
tent with its effectiveness.' 3' To complicate matters even further, states
themselves should be viewed "as co-operative networks of networks and
not as sovereign units."'32
These ideas, even as compressed and over-simplified as they are
here, are all valuable in helping to explain, justify, and amplify the
functions of global transgovernmental regulatory networks. They also
provide a much richer context for introducing the idea of global
information agencies. The ultimate task is to integrate ideas of
delegation, transgovernmental deliberation, and horizontal democracy in
ways that recognize the continuing existence of the territorial state and
designated "public" officials but that take full and central account of the
possibilities and actuality of "private" self-organization.
C. Legislative Networks
Even assuming a completely integrated concept of post-modem de-
mocracy, however, a key element would be missing. Elected
representatives are surely not obsolete. Popular perceptions of democ-
racy are likely to remain relatively impervious to theoretical redefinition.
Dahl's very simple concept of democracy-the control of the elite by the
mass-will still resonate. Government by elected representatives will
still approximate this ideal in important ways.
It is thus vital to add legislative networks to the existing networks of
regulators and judges currently operating as an informal global govern-
ance system. Many worthy organizations exist designed to bring together
the world's parliamentarians. A number of inter-governmental institu-
tions, from the OSCE to NATO, have parliamentary assemblies
composed of national legislators, many of which play a more important
role than is often realized. Nevertheless, with all the summits of heads of
government, central bankers, finance ministers, justice ministers, envi-
ronmental ministers, and even judges, the absence of meetings among
powerful national legislators is striking.
Former senator Jesse Helms, then-chair of the U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, finally went to the U.N. to meet the assembled
ambassadors. He did not go, however, to meet his counterparts in control
130. This combination of direct participation in problem solving combined with con-
stant, structured information pooling and benchmarking lies at the heart of Dorf and Sabel's
vision of democratic experimentalism. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 101, at 286-89.
131. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 23, at 332-33.
132. Ladeur, supra note 128, at 166.
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of foreign relations committees in legislatures around the world. With
the advent of President Vicente Fox in Mexico, however, Senator Helms
agreed to a meeting between his committee members and their counter-
parts in the Mexican legislature.'33 Groups of legislators from around the
world have also met to share ideas and initiatives on legislation in spe-
cific issue areas, such as human rights and the environment. But before
entertaining any more ideas for a global parliament, 4 national policy-




Global governance is taking place through global networks of na-
tional government officials. These networks can exist within
international institutions, within the framework of inter-governmental
agreements of various kinds, and on their own as spontaneous responses
to the need to interact to coordinate policy and address common prob-
lems. This typology is hardly the only way to identify and categorize
different types of transgovernmental networks; it would be equally pos-
sible and probably useful to distinguish them in terms of the different
functions they perform, such as rule-making versus enforcement, or in
terms of the different degrees and even types of power they can exer-
cise.""
This particular typology, however, helps illuminate different types of
accountability concerns. It appears to reflect varying degrees of
democratic input and control, depending on the extent to which the elected
representatives of the people were ever consulted as to the desirability of
establishing such networks, much less their actual operation. It also allows
us to see international institutions as just another framework for the
operation of transgovernmental networks, at least in many cases. Genuine
supranational bureaucracies certainly exist, but they are far smaller than
might be supposed.
Here also is the parallel to the EU. The networks of national gov-
ernment officials who comprise the comitology system exhibit many of
the same characteristics of transgovernmental networks more generally,
133. William Safire, Essay, Fox, Bush and Helms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at A15.
134. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, 80 FOREIGN AFF.
212 (2001).
135. See Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community,
in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 155
(Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1991).
136. Vervaele, for instance, distinguishes enforcement networks from other types of
networks. Vervaele, supra note 107, at 135.
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including perceptions of their lack of legitimacy. It is thus possible to
borrow specific solutions from the EU context, such as the creation of
global information agencies.
In the final analysis, however, disaggregated decision-making by na-
tional government officials who have a loyalty both to their national
constituents and to the need to solve a larger problem in the interests of
people beyond national borders requires a more sophisticated concept of
disaggregated democracy. Developing such a concept is likely to require
a synthesis of anti-majoritarian rationales, deliberative politics, and self-
actualization through networks of every kind. The task ahead is to de-
velop such a synthesis in such a way that it can be both operationalized
and actually communicated to the people it is supposed to serve.
